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aBStract .
To achieve successful cooperative inter-firm relationships, trust between the 
partners is a key factor. As trust that is based on the self-commitment of the 
partners to behave in a non-opportunistic way (maxim-based trust) takes time 
to evolve and relies upon the cooperation experience of the partners, we expect 
that the positive performance impact of maxim-based trust grows over time. The 
purpose of this paper is to test the moderating effect of cooperation experience 
on the relationship between maxim-based trust and performance in the context 
of cooperating small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in two transformation 
economies (Czech Republic and Slovenia): Based on a sample of 124 SMEs, a 
moderated regression analysis reveals that trust and cooperation experience 
impact positively on performance. However, we could not detect a moderated 
relationship. We conclude that maxim-based trust may be an effective and 
efficent coordinating mechanism in the dynamic context of cooperating SMEs in 
transformation economies, but the absence of a moderating effect indicates that 
firms do not seem to increase the effects of maxim-based trust over time. 
Keywords: Cooperation; Trust; Cooperation Experience; Maxim-based 
Trust.
ISSN: 1576-0162
rESumEn .
La confianza es uno de los elementos principales que permiten obtener 
éxito en las relaciones de cooperación entre empresas. La confianza 
basada en el propio compromiso de las empresas and que no es fruto de 
un comportamiento oportunista (maxim-based trust) se desarrolla a través la 
experiencia en cooperación entre las empresas, por lo que surge con el tiempo. 
Por ello, consideramos que los efectos positivos de este tipo de confianza 
aumentan conforme pasa el tiempo. El objetivo de este trabajo es medir los 
efectos que la experiencia en cooperación provoca sobre la relación entre la 
confianza basada en el compromiso (maxim-based trust) and los resultados 
obtenidos de la misma en el caso de la colaboración entre pequeñas and 
medianas empresas (pymes) en dos economías en transición (República Checa 
and Eslovenia): El análisis de regresión moderada, basado en una muestra 
de 124 pymes, muestra que la confianza and la experiencia en cooperación 
ejercen un impacto positivo sobre los resultados, aunque no se observa relación 
moderada. Concluimos que la confianza basada en el compromiso (maxim-
based trust) puede ser un mecanismo de coordinación efectivo and eficiente 
en el contexto dinámico de la cooperación entre pymes en economías en 
transición. No obstante, la ausencia de efecto moderador indica que los efectos 
en las empresas de la confianza basada en la el compromiso no aumentan con 
el tiempo.
Palabras clave: Cooperación; Confianza; Experiencia en cooperación; 
Confianza basada en el compromiso (Maxim-based Trust).
JEL classification: F23, M13, O52, P29.
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1 . introduction1 .
Interfirm cooperation is potentially an attractive strategy for firms that wish to 
pool resources and knowledge, reap combined scale effects or preempt strategic 
buying and selling markets. However, cooperating firms have to deal with the 
uncertainty of their partner’s behaviour. To deal with the behavioral uncertainty, 
relational “mechanisms and norms” such as solidarity, flexibility and, particularly, 
trust, can be employed (Krishnan, Martin and Noorderhaven, 2006). 
Trust, which can be defined as the willingness to “accept vulnerability 
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another 
party” (Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 394), can have many benefits for cooperative 
performance (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Smith, Carroll and Ashford, 
1995). Trust can reduce the potential for conflict, increase the speed and 
reliability of the information flow between partners and may reduce the need 
for formal control (Krishnan, Martin and Noorderhaven 2006). Generally 
speaking, trust is said to reduce agency and transaction costs (Frank 1988; 
Jones and George, 1998) and it supports a firm’s capacity to handle complexity 
and adapt to change (Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza, 1995).
Even though there is a strong normative bias towards the inherent value of 
trust in the current literature (Atuahene-Gima and Li, 2002), empirical findings 
do not draw such a clear picture of a positive impact of trust on cooperative 
performance. For example, McAllister (1995) found a positive impact only upon 
specific forms of trust. Also, there might be circumstances under which the trust-
performance relationship is stronger (or weaker) than in other circumstances. 
McGee et al. (1995) provides an extensive literature review on empirical findings 
concerning the moderating role of experience on the effect of cooperation 
on performance. However, to our knowledge, there are no empirical studies 
investigating the moderating effect of cooperative experience on the relationship 
between trust and performance in inter-firm cooperation.  
1 Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Mrs. Natalia Marczuk for the careful editing of the ma-
nuscript. The authors assume full responsibility for remaining errors.
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Recently, in the context of inter-firm cooperation, maxim-based trust –a 
form of trust which is based on the partners’ self-commitment to refrain from 
unfair behaviour– has been discussed as being an especially effective and 
efficient force for behavioural coordination (Roessl, 1996; Eberl, 2004; Fink, 
2005; Fink & Kessler, 2010): However, as cooperative relationships which are 
coordinated by such maxim-based trust take time to emerge (see section 3.1), 
we expect that the performance advantages of engaging in such relationships 
to get stronger over time. Hence, we contribute to the literature by analyzing 
the impact of cooperative experience on the relationship between maxim-
based trust and performance.
2 . truSt in cooPErativE rElationShiPS of SmES in tranSition countriES .
In research on trust, it must be acknowledged that the antecedents and 
consequences of trust vary depending on the actors and the context in which 
the actors operate (Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007). For example, the 
economic framework conditions in which those firms operate have to be 
considered. We propose to investigate the performance contributions of 
cooperation experience and maxim-based trust in cooperative relationships 
between SMEs in two transition economies, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. 
The SME context is particularly suited for trust research as the conditions 
of the evolution of trust-based relationships are especially favourable (Fink and 
Kraus, 2007; Fink and Roessl, 2007). In particular, SMEs in transition economies 
have developed a remarkably strong tendency to cooperate (Fink and Keßler, 
2010). In Slovenia, cooperation was an attractive strategy to follow, because 
in the years after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
in 1990 and the resulting foundation of an independent state, the Slovenian 
capital market was dramatically underdeveloped (Pissarides, 1999; Bukvic and 
Bartlett, 2003). The strong inclination to cooperate might also be due to the small 
domestic market of approximately two million potential customers. In the Czech 
Republic, SME have a tight, cooperative network across the national border. In 
the previous Austrian Monarchy, the area that is now the Czech Republic was 
one of the economic hotspots and after the fall of the iron curtain these business 
relations were successfully reestablished (Fink and Kraus, 2007).
Also, the context of transition economies is particularly suitable for 
our research. Both Slovenia and the Czech Republic are in a late stage of 
transition from planned economies to free-market economies, a position that 
is reflected by the EU membership of both countries. A late stage of transition 
is characterized by reduced macroeconomic uncertainty, reduced inflation, 
development of a legal framework for private businesses and infrastructure 
reform (Smallbone and Welter, 2001). This enables SMEs to move from a focus 
on short-term profits and from an industry focus on trade and services to a 
focus on longer-term profits and to industries that require a higher share of 
fixed investments (Smallbone et al., 1999). Pertaining to strategy, SMEs in 
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advanced stages of transition begin to export, supported by a competitive 
strategy based on low prices. However, the growing competition in world 
markets increases pressure on SMEs that might be counteracted by engaging 
in cooperations. In short, the macroeconomic and legal situation enables SMEs 
to engange in long-term strategies such as cooperation. Driven by competitive 
pressures, SMEs might be forced into cooperation. 
3 . maxim-BaSEd truSt: dEfinition and ElEmEntS .
3 .1 . oriGinS of truSt: maxim-BaSEd truSt and inStrumEntal truSt .
Trust, defined as the willingness to “accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another party” (Rousseau et 
al., 1998:394), can have different foundations. In particular, we distinguish 
between instrumental and maxim-based trust. Instrumental trust highlights 
the exogenous behavioral compliance of cooperative partners with the 
explicit and implicit regulations existing within the cooperation. Actors who 
are instrumentally trusted are accountable to those trusting them. Recently, 
researchers began to analyze the role of maxim-based trust. Maxim-based trust 
focuses on an internal compliance to the maxim of acting non-opportunistically 
and draws its coordination potential from the behavior-restricting effect of the 
actors’ self-commitment to the cooperation. Actors who are trusted based 
upon a maxim basis are accountable to themselves. 
Maxim-based trust may provide a strong basis for cooperative relationships 
and finally for cooperative performance. First, Möllering (2006:198) points out 
that the leap of faith that is one of the foundations of maxim-based trust helps 
to generate a strong basis for trust: “The leap of faith helps to generate and 
maintain the reasons, institutions and processes from which it first springs and, 
hence, it is truly crucial for our understanding of trust and its bases.” Second, as 
the willingness to commit to the maxim of acting non-opportunistically stems 
from an intrinsic motivation, it can be a stronger motivator than extrinsically 
triggered instrumental trust. 
3 .2 . thE EmErGEncE of maxim-BaSEd truSt .
Maxim-based trust draws its coordinative strength from the behavior-
standardizing effect of the actors’ self-commitment based on the maxim of 
cooperative behavior, and thereby reduces the actors’ tendency towards 
opportunistic behavior (Ripper ger, 1998): Actors who are trusted based on 
a maxim basis are accountable to themselves, i.e. they are self-obligated. 
In the case of cooperation, the self-commitment is based on refraining from 
opportunistic behavior.
The emergence of maxim-based trust begins when the actors perceive 
themselves as self-committed to a cooperative behaviour when dealing with 
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each other. This way of looking at the cooperation is primarily based on the 
cooperative partners’ reputation that allows the actor to give the cooperation 
partner an “advance” on trust (Pidduck, 2006). This advance can be risky, 
and accepting this risk signals to partner B that partner A views him as self-
committed, and partner A is committing to partner B without the protection of 
control and sanction opportunities (McLain and Hackman, 1999). 
In a cooperation that begins based on these processes, self-committing 
actors align their behaviour to the shared goals of the cooperation without 
external pressure. The cooperative behaviour experienced by the parties justifies 
and strengthens the maxim-based trust in the other partner and strengthens 
their own self-attachment to cooperative behaviour (Rusbult, Martz and Agnew, 
1998). In maxim-based trust, a relationship as a self-strengthening process 
unfolds, which results in a self-committed communication and structure.
fiGurE 1: Evolution of a maxim-BaSEd truSt rElationShiP .
A‘s act of trust
(A‘s self commitment)
Trustworthiness
(A considers B trustworthy) 
A‘s trust expectations of B
B‘s act of trust
(B‘s self commitment)
B‘s trust expectations of A
Trustworthiness
(B considers A trustworthy) 
Co
-op
era
tor
 A
Co
-op
era
tor
B
Source: Own elaboration.
The process leads to a situation in which the cooperation partners 
mutually submit to each other and by doing so they reduce their counterpart’s 
inclination to behave opportunistically. Once economic value is created 
in a context of a trust-based relationship, each partner is motivated not to 
jeopardize this value (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). Even though latitude 
for opportunistic behaviour still exists, restricting the participants’ inclination 
to behave opportunistically reduces behavioural uncertainty, which reduces 
the complexity and the risk of the transactional relationship (Roessl 1994; 
Osterloh and Weibel, 2000; Fink, 2005).
The evolution processes of instrumental and maxim-based trust have 
completely different points of departure: in the context of instrumental trust, 
the starting point is the actor’s attempt to limit his transactional partner’s 
behavioural portfolio in order to control his actions; in the context of maxim-
based trust, the starting point is the partner’s self-commitment to restrict his 
own behavioural portfolio to what is agreed upon. 
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3 .2 . thE ElEmEntS of a maxim-BaSEd truSt rElationShiP .
Self-commitment
A maxim-based cooperative relationship has two key components: (1) 
self-commitment and (2) a heterarchic structure. Self-commitment comprises 
several dimensions (Roessl 1994; 1996): the reputation of the partner 
provides information on the extent to which he has met the expectations 
of his interaction partners in the past. This affects an actor’s decision to 
commit to the relationship. Familiarity is based on personal impressions and 
provides information about the specific cooperation partner in the ongoing 
relationship: A can commit to the relationship with B because A has a broad 
basis of information to support his evaluation of the partner (Roessl, 1994). 
Another indicator is the cooperative partner’s perceived behavioural history. 
In particular, the stability of the maxims that are motivating for a specific 
behaviour is crucial here. Self-commitment requires observable behavioural 
norms which remain stable over time and therefore allow a prognosis of the 
cooperative partner’s future behaviour (Lindskold, 1981; Luhmann, 1989; 
Roessl, 1994). As perceived behavioural history is not based on personal 
observation but on observations by others, it has to be obtained actively. 
The source of this information is socialized impressions of others. If the 
cooperative partners build up a personal relationship, the relationship will be 
enriched by personal connotations, taking the relationship to a higher level. 
Such personal relationships between self-committed cooperative partners 
have a long-term perspective (Roessl, 1994; Kanter, 1995; Becaerra and 
Gupta, 2003). 
A further dimension of self-commitment is the actor’s self-restriction. The 
actor confines himself to cooperative behaviour. Thereby, he takes the risk 
that his expectations concerning his cooperative partner’s behaviour might be 
frustrated. Therefore, the willingness to take a risk is another dimension of 
self-commitment. This willingness to take risks requires frustration tolerance; 
that is, the actor’s belief in his ability to cope with situations resulting from a 
frustration of his expectations (Roessl, 1994).
As outlined, a maxim-based relationship requires a leap of faith, which 
the interaction partner might capitalize on by defecting from the relationship 
unexpectedly, particularly when the actor is committed to self-exposure. 
Heterarchic Relationship
In cooperation based on maxim-based trust, heterarchic relationships 
evolve. Heterarchic relationships are characterized by the equal status 
of the partners. They can be delineated on the one hand from hierarchical 
relationships (that are characterized by power, control and sanction, Pleitner 
and Roessl, 1995) and a rigid structure of competences (Strohmayer, 1996), 
and on the other hand from informal relationships (that is, relationships with 
only an absolute minimum of rules): More specifically, heterarchic relationships 
are characterized by certain structural and interpersonal characteristics. 
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The structural characteristics of heterarchic relationship are characterized 
by no or a low degree of  power distance between the partners, who remain 
autonomous in their decisions (Strohmayer, 1996). The partners adjust their 
behaviour mutually and voluntarily in the context of an organized relationship. 
Consequently, each cooperator has the possibility of a one-sided defection 
relationship at any time.
In terms of interpersonal characteristics, partners in relationships founded on 
maxim-based trust will enjoy high communication quality. The communication 
quality ensures that all participants can contribute their ideas and safeguard 
their interests. This is crucial for exchanging opinions and thoughts between the 
partners of the cooperative relationship and contributes to high relationship 
quality (Kanter 1995; Becaerra and Gupta, 2003). Heterarchic relationships 
are also characterized by a high degree of transparency. Transparency captures 
the cooperative partners’ openness concerning the internal processes of their 
firms. The more the actor knows about his interaction partner, the less risk he 
will perceive in the trust relationship, and the more likely it is that a heterarchic 
cooperative relationship will evolve (De Búrca, Fynes and Roche, 2004). 
Resilience describes the robustness of the relationship in terms of conflict 
solving capacity and is an issue that arises in terms of crisis (De Búrca, Fynes 
and Roche, 2004).
4 . dEvEloPmEnt of thE hyPothESES .
4 .1 . thE PErformancE contriBution of maxim-BaSEd truSt .
Among the coordination mechanisms of cooperative relationships, maxim-
based trust has a number of advantages over other mechanisms such as 
instrumental trust (trust based on exogenous behavioural compliance with 
explicit and implicit regulations) and formal rules. 
First, partners in a relationship based on maxim-based trust can be more 
flexible. One argument here is that maxim-based trust is not sensitive to 
specific circumstances, as it is based on a general belief in that the partner 
does not behave opportunistically. Instrumental trust and formal rules, 
however, need to be defined while keeping in mind specific situations to which 
it can applied (Noorderhaven, 1996; Fink, 2005). Another argument is based 
on the idea that maxim-based trust does not reduce the actors’ behavioural 
portfolio, thus saving the resources of monitoring and sanction mechanisms. 
These flexibility advantages become more important when the complexity in 
a transaction relationship increases and the ability to translate expectations 
into well-defined and easily monitored agreements declines (Roessl, 1996; 
Eberl, 2004).
Second, relationships based on maxim-based trust are characterized by 
high communication quality, stability, resilience, transparency and honesty 
as well as relationship intensity (Roessl, 1994; De Búrca, Fynes and Roche, 
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2004). These characteristics evolve in heterarchic relationships (see section 
3.2) and can increase the speed and reliability of the information flow 
between partners and may reduce the need for formal control (Krishnan, 
Martin and Noorderhaven, 2006). 
Third, maxim-based trust enables transactional relationships which 
would otherwise not take place due to high behavioural uncertainty. Once 
companies possess the competence to establish and to manage relationships 
based on maxim-based trust, they may capitalize on additional opportunities 
which their competitors have to forego, since other firms might not be able to 
manage a transactional relationship in uncertain environments and uncertain 
cooperation contexts. 
Finally, from a resource-based perspective, the ability to establish and 
maintain a cooperative relationship coordinated by maxim-based trust can be 
seen as a valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutional resource (Barney, 
1991 or also Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). Maxim-based cooperations rely 
on specific socio-psychosocial profiles of the cooperation partners that enable 
them to take the “leap of faith” to enter such a cooperation. Based on the idea 
that the propensity to take the (risky) leap of faith is related to the risk-taking 
propensity of individuals, which itself is rather rare in a population (Brockhaus, 
1980) these socio-psychological profiles might be even more rare. Given their 
dependence on rare starting conditions and path-dependent idiosyncratic 
evolution processes, maxim-based cooperative relationships are inimitable 
and non-substitutionable. Hence, maxim-based relationships may be a source 
of a competitive advantage. 
H1: The more behavioral coordination relies on maxim-based trust in a 
cooperative relationship, the better the performance of the focal participating 
company will be.
4 .2 thE PErformancE contriBution of cooPEration ExPEriEncE . 
Evolutionary theory (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002) claims that a firm’s 
competences evolve through incremental adaptation and progressive learning. 
Also, organizational learning theory argues that companies may develop the 
capacity to handle complex transactional relationships by gaining experience 
in similar settings. In an interactive process, the firm extracts inferences from 
experience gained in past cooperation relationships and extrapolates them to 
future situations in order to improve its behaviour (Argyris and Schoen, 1978; 
Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Levitt and March, 1988). 
In the context of cooperative relationships, these competences grow 
along with experience on two levels: first, on the level of general experience 
in cooperation management, and second, on the level of specific experience 
gained in a cooperative relationship with a particular partner (Brulhart, 2007). 
The experience can be gained by engaging in either domestic or international 
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cooperative relationships (Nadolska and Barkema, 2007). Based on the 
arguments above, we propose the following hypothesis:
H2: A cooperating company’s cooperation experience has a positive effect 
on the focal firm’s business performance.
4 .3 . thE modEratinG EffEct of cooPEration ExPEriEncE on thE rElationShiP 
BEtwEEn maxim-BaSEd truSt and cooPEration .
Relationships which are coordinated by maxim-based trust typically 
evolve over time. This evolution cannot be accelerated with force. It rests on 
a consistent long-term strategy aimed at building up a good reputation and 
ensuring a positively perceived history. This requires a long-lasting personal 
relationship with the cooperation partner, in the course of which, one has 
credibly communicated a willingness to take risks, a sufficient level of frustration 
tolerance and readiness for self-restriction and self-exposure. Self-exposure is 
only legitimated by its result. A positive result, in turn, strengthens the trust 
relationship. This implies that the experience a firm has gained in cooperative 
relationships in the past strengthens the performance contribution of maxim-
based trust in current cooperative relationships. Accordingly, we propose the 
following hypothesis:
H3: The more cooperative experience a firm has, the stronger will be the 
relationship between maxim-based trust and business performance.
5 . mEthodS .
5 .1 . SamPlinG framE and rESPonSE ratES .
The population consists of SMEs from the advanced transition economies 
of The Czech Republic and Slovenia. Using addresses from national SME 
databases, random samples of 4000 SMEs for each country were drawn. The 
survey yielded a total of 339 (4.2%) returned questionnaires. Of these SMEs, 
212 firms indicated that they participate in cooperative activities. This low 
response rate can be partially explained by the fact that SME are particularly 
reluctant to answer surveys (Bartholomew and Smith, 2006) and partially 
because non-cooperating SME might not have taken part in the survey. 
Due to missing data, 124 firms were included in the analysis. Analyses of 
non-response bias, e.g. by performing telephone interviews with a random 
sample of 45 non-respondents from each country showed no systematic 
bias for missing respondents (Rogelberg and Stanton, 2007). In addition, the 
comparison of firms with complete data and missing data did not show any 
systematic biases. 
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5 .2 . oPErationalization .
Maxim-based Trust: Constructing a Formative Indicator
We measured the extent of maxim-based trust by surveying the extent 
to which self-commitment and heterarchic relationships are present in the 
focal cooperation (see section 3.3.): Drawing on criteria for the selection of 
measurement models (Jarvis, MacKenzie and Podsakoff, 2003), we decided to 
use formative measurement. In formative measurement, it is assumed that the 
construct is “composed” of the indicators. Each indicator provides an aspect of 
the content domain of the construct and is hence non-interchangeable. 
To calculate the formative construct, we followed the steps outlined by 
Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001). To ensure that the content domain 
is captured adequately, we performed a literature analysis and enhanced the 
results by drawing on knowledge from a network of researchers that are active 
in the field of cooperation. We allocated the items to the specific constructs 
and used four-point scales (“completely agree”, “inclined to agree”, “inclined 
to disagree” and “completely disagree”) to measure all items. Then, we 
checked for multicolinearity to avoid repeat counts of similar content in the 
formative measurement. Finally, we added the responses to each variable in 
an unweighted additive score. 
Cooperative Experience
Cooperative experience was captured by three distinct indicators: the number 
of cooperative relationships (metric), the duration of the focal cooperation 
(ordinal) and the existence of international cooperation (categorical). 
Performance
SMEs enter cooperative relationships for many reasons: to access 
international markets (e.g. Cullen et al., 2000; Carson et al., 2006), to reap scale 
benefits (Masurel and Janszen, 1998), or to share knowledge in cooperative 
innovation (Levy, Loebbecke and Powell, 2003), just to name a few examples. 
Therefore, the proximal, particular goals of a cooperation are quite diverse, 
and firms which may score high on one particular goal may not even have 
attempted to achieve another goal. Therefore, we chose firm performance, 
a distal performance indicator, as a dependent variable. This choice is also 
supported by the idea that a relevant cooperation should also impact upon a 
firm’s performance in a significant way. To measure performance, we assessed 
aspects of financial performance, other aspects of external performance and 
indicators of internal performance by using four-point scales (“completely 
agree”, “inclined to agree”, “inclined to disagree” and “completely disagree”) 
and integrated them in a formative construct (unweighted additive index): 
Table 1 shows the variables employed, along with their sources and the items 
used, while Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations. 
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taBlE1: mEaSurEmEnt of maxim-BaSEd truSt and PErformancE .
Variables Items
m
ax
im
-b
as
ed
 t
ru
st
 
se
lf-
co
m
m
itm
en
t
reputation
Before establishing the cooperation relationship, I had heard 
good things about my cooperation partner.
familiarity
I have cooperated with my present cooperative partner in 
the past.
perceived 
behavioral 
history
Before establishing the cooperative relationship, I gathered 
information about my cooperative partner. 
personal 
relationship
I also meet my cooperative partner in my private life.
no short-term 
perspective
With the cooperative relationship, I aim to realize noticeable 
success as fast as possible.
self-restriction
I attune my behavior to the aims of the cooperative 
relationship.
willingness to 
take a risk
I am willing to take a risk.
frustration 
tolerance
I am convinced that I am able to cope with setbacks.
self-exposure
The cooperative relationship has a strong influence upon the 
success of my company.
leap of faith
In order to make cooperation work, one has to take a leap of 
faith with one’s cooperative partner, even though this involves 
risk.
he
te
ra
rc
hi
c 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
st
ru
ct
ur
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s
organized 
relationship
My cooperative partners and I talk about the cooperation.
mutually 
adjusted 
behavior
My cooperative partner and I take joint action in the area of 
cooperation.
autonomy
I have remained legally independent within the cooperative 
arrangement.
equality
In decisions regarding the cooperative relationship, the 
opinion of each cooperative partner is equally important.
possibility 
of one-sided 
defection 
By behaving opportunistically, I could damage the 
cooperative relationship.
voluntary 
nature of 
relationship  
I can terminate the cooperative relationship unilaterally at 
any time.
in
te
rp
er
so
na
l 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
communication 
quality
I can get right to the point when speaking with my 
cooperative partner.
resilience
Discussions with my cooperative partner always result in a 
solution.
transparency
I know the internal processes in my cooperative partner’s 
company.
relationship 
intensity
Since its establishment, the cooperative relationship has 
gained intensity.
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pe
rf
or
m
an
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en
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us
 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e
employee 
qualifications
Since the establishment of the cooperation relationship, the 
qualifications of my employees have improved.
employee turnover
Since the establishment of the cooperative relationship, fewer 
employees have left my company. 
ex
og
en
ou
s 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e
customer satisfaction
My customers are always satisfied with my products and 
services.
share of regular 
customers
Most of my customers are regular customers.
market development
Since the establishment of the cooperative relationship, I 
have enlarged my market share.
share of regular 
suppliers
Most of my suppliers are regular suppliers.
fin
an
ci
al
 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e
cash flow 
development
Since the establishment of the cooperative relationship, I 
have boosted my cash flow. 
sales development
Since the establishment of the cooperative relationship, I 
have boosted my sales.
development of 
investment activity
Since the establishment of the cooperative relationship, I 
have boosted my investments.
TaBlE 2: mEanS, Standard dEviationS and corrElationS .
Mean
Standard
deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) 
performance
34.25 5.06 1
(2) firm size 2.33 .92 .034 1
(3) firm age 2.41 .76 -.074 .254** 1
(4) number of 
cooperative 
relationships
1.81 .87 .156* .166* -.041 1
(5) 
duration of 
cooperation
3.24 1.39 .206* .013 .116 .141 1
(6) 
international 
cooperation 
(yes/no)
.52 .50 .223** .078 -.058 .086 .072 1
(7) maxim-
based trust
61.72 6.34 .557** .106 -.055 .157* .206* .074 1
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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6 . rESultS .
As the method of analysis, we used moderated regression analysis (Aiken 
and West 1991). First, a linear model was calculated. In a second model, the 
moderator variable was introduced. The results of the hierarchical regression 
analysis can be found in Table 3. 
taBlE 3: rESultS of thE analySiS (n=124) .
linear model moderation model
β β
Firm size .014 -.004
Firm age -.093 -.080
Number of cooperative relationships .042 .037
Duration of cooperation .154* .871
International cooperation (yes/no) .215** .215**
Maxim-based trust .459*** .634**
Duration * Maxim-based trust -.746
R2 .306** .311***
Adjusted R2 .271** .270***
Note: Standardized regression coefficients are displayed in the table. * p<0.5; ** p<0.01; *** 
p<0.001.
In the linear model, the control variables did not impact upon performance 
(firm size: β = .014, p=.864; firm age: β = -.093, p=.509): Among the 
values pertaining to cooperative experience, the number of cooperative 
relationships was not significantly related to performance, but the duration 
of the cooperation and the existence of international cooperation exhibited a 
positive significant relationship with performance (β = .154, p = .049; β = 
.733, p = .007): Moreover, maxim-based trust also had a strong and positive 
impact upon performance (β = .459, p = .000): In the moderation model, we 
could not detect a significant relationship (β = -.746, p = .364):
In combination, these results do not contradict H1 and H2: Both 
cooperative experience and maxim-based trust have a positive influence 
upon business performance. However, we did not detect a moderation of the 
relationship between maxim-based trust and performance by the duration of 
the cooperation.  
7 . diScuSSion, limitationS and imPlicationS .
Based on the conceptual arguments put forth in the literature on trust in 
general and on maxim-based trust in particular we assumed that maxim-based 
trust has a positive impact upon the performance of the focal firm. Drawing 
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on organizational learning, we also assumed that cooperative experience has 
a positive impact upon the focal firm’s performance and we assumed that 
cooperative experience can strengthen the link between maxim-based trust 
and performance. 
The findings support the idea that maxim-based trust and cooperative 
experience have a positive linear effect upon the focal firm’s performance. 
However, a moderation effect of experience upon the relationship between 
maxim-based trust and performance could not be observed. 
A possible explanation for this missing moderation relationship could be 
that it is not so much the quantity but the quality of experience the firm has 
accumulated in past relationships which may serve as a fruitful ground for 
the evolution of successful cooperative relationships which are coordinated 
by maxim-based trust. For example, long-time experience in hierarchically 
governed cooperative relationships may contribute only very little to a firm’s 
capacity to evolve an effective and efficient maxim-based trust relationship with 
a cooperative partner. McGee, Dowling and Megginson (1995) argue that firms 
often fail to learn in cooperative relations because they are not aware of what 
they do not know. This argument is empirically underpinned by Reich and Mankin 
(1986) in a sample of partnerships between US and Japanese companies.
In the current cooperative relationships the impact of maxim-based trust 
upon the performance (distal performance measure) of the participating firms 
might materialize quickly and does not increase significantly with time. This 
result has to be interpreted with caution because those relationships in which 
one party has behaved opportunistically are likely to break up and are not 
counted as ongoing cooperative relationships in our study. 
However, one of the key benefits of maxim-based trust is the longevity 
and the flexibility of the cooperative relationship over time, or, more 
generally, the relationship quality (proximal performance measure): This idea 
is underscored by the positive and significant correlation coefficient between 
the duration of the cooperative relationship and the degree of maxim-based 
trust (β = .206, p = .017).
However, our results must be interpreted in the light of the shortcomings 
of this study. First, the low response rate has to be qualified in light of the 
fact that surveys on SMEs (especially in transition economies) typically show 
low response rates. This difficulty is exacerbated when surveys address 
sensitive issues such as trust in cooperative partners. However, our check 
for non-response bias showed no systematic bias. Second, the one-sided 
measurement of maxim-based trust is justified by theoretical arguments 
and therefore does not compromise the empirical results. However, the 
measure should be subjected to further validation in qualitative as well as 
quantitative studies using pairs of cooperators. Pairing would further increase 
the reliability of the data, but at same time represents a major challenge with 
regard to the anonymity of the respondents and, consequently, the resulting 
response rate. 
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The limitations notwithstanding, our study suggests that cooperation based 
on maxim-based trust is a possible key to boosting a firm’s performance. 
By pursuing cooperative strategies, SMEs can strengthen their competitive 
positioning as inter-firm cooperation can help to access international markets 
(Cullen, Johnson and Sakano, 2000; Carson, Madhok and Wu, 2006; Fink 
et al., 2008), to reap scale benefits (Masurel and Janszen 1998) or to share 
knowledge (Levy, Loebbecke and Powell, 2003). At the same time, the 
coordination by maxim-based trust allows for flexibility, can be managed 
without costly formal control mechanisms and can bring about high quality 
communication. Hence, the ability to develop maxim-based trust opens up the 
possibility for SMEs to realize transactional relationships that otherwise could 
not be coordinated due to prohibitively high complexity and uncertainty. Once 
a cooperative relationship based on maxim-based trust is established, it can 
be the source of a competitive advantage, since it is based on valuable, rare, 
inimitable and non-substitutable capabilities. 
Even though our results do not imply that the relationship between 
maxim-based trust and a firm’s performance increases with the duration of 
the cooperation, we would caution against perceiving it as a management tool 
for short-term intervention. In light of our empirical results, further research 
in this field is certainly worthwhile, both from a scientific and a practical point 
of view.
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